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LEVERAGING PREDICTIVE POLICING ALGORITHMS TO 
RESTORE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN HIGH-CRIME 
AREAS IN A POST-WARDLOW WORLD 
KELLY K. KOSS
INTRODUCTION
Before walking the streets of his beat in Chicago’s West Englewood 
neighborhood, on October 25, 2017, Officer Adams uses one of the sta-
tion’s computers to get the latest report on today’s forecasted criminal ac-
tivity.1 The report designates part of Officer Adams’ beat, specifically the 
500-foot radius around the intersection of South Ashland Avenue and West 
72nd Street, as a “high-crime area”2 for brown-heroin trafficking. The statis-
tical output from the Chicago Police Department’s sophisticated predictive 
policing software indicates that at around 8:22 P.M., Officer Adams can 
anticipate that a gang-related brown-heroin trafficking transaction will 
occur at this location. At 8:26 P.M, Officer Adams observes two young 
black men huddled closely together; one of them is holding a plastic bag at 
the corner of South Ashland Avenue and 73rd Place, which is located ap-
proximately 1,000 feet from the anticipated drug trafficking location. Be-
fore Officer Adams acts to stop-and-frisk the two men, he must decide 
whether his minimal observations—the two men huddled together while 
one holds a plastic bag—combined with the high-crime designation 1,000 
feet north of this location, is enough to establish reasonable suspicion. Is it?  
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case addressing is-
sues related to law enforcement’s use of data-driven tips from predictive 
policing software. However, soon, the courts will need to address how data 
from predictive policing software factors into the Fourth Amendment’s3
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Master of 
Urban and Regional Planning & Master of Urban Design, University of Michigan. The author would 
like to thank Professors Douglas Godfrey and Christopher Schmidt for their guidance, and her family 
and friends for their support.
 1. Please note that this is a hypothetical situation intended to illustrate how predictive policing is 
or may be used in the future by some police departments. The Chicago Police Department currently 
employs CompStat in its operations and not the technology described above. 
 2.  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972) (creating the term “high-crime area”). 
 3.  The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
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reasonable suspicion calculus because this software is becoming increas-
ingly popular4 and is revolutionizing policing practices across the United 
States. Predictive policing technologies have become so powerful that these 
complex computerized algorithms5 can now help reveal localized future 
crime patterns before they even emerge.6
Predictive policing is defined as using quantitative analysis to make 
statistical predictions to suggest probable targets for criminal activity, pre-
vent crime, and solve past crimes.7 The theory that crime is predictable is 
well documented.8 Studies have demonstrated that criminals are creatures 
of habit, committing the same types of crimes that they have successfully 
committed in the past.9 Not only do criminals repeatedly commit the same 
types of crimes, they also tend to commit subsequent crimes in close geo-
graphic proximity to the original crime at approximately the same time of 
day as the original crime.10 For decades, law enforcement agencies have 
taken advantage of this predictability by linking geospatial information to 
past crime data.11 Police departments initially placed pushpins on paper 
maps to reveal clusters of criminal activity within a jurisdiction; however, 
recent technological advances have enabled police departments to move 
 4.  Leslie A. Gordon, Predictive Policing May Help Bag Burglars—but it May Also be a Consti-
tutional Problem, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/predictive_policing_may_help_bag_burglars—
but_it_may_also_be_a_constitutio/. 
 5.  Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, 266 NAT’L INST. JUST.
J. (June 2010), http://www.nij.gov/journals/266/Pages/predictive.aspx (In the case of predictive policing 
software, an algorithm is a complex mathematical formula “taking data from disparate sources, analyz-
ing them and then using results to anticipate, prevent and respond more effectively to future crime.”). 
 6.  For example, the Santa Cruz Police Department uses PredPol software to forecast crime using 
a complex algorithm that takes information about past crimes and makes projections on a daily basis 
about which locations and windows of time have a heightened risk for crime. See Erica Goode, Sending 
the Police before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html. 
 7.  WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 1–2 (2013).  
 8.  See Gordon, supra note 4 (quoting George Mason University Professor, Cynthia Lum, who 
says that crime is predictable—”[i]t’s most likely to occur tomorrow where it occurred yesterday. We 
know that about offenders too: People who commit crimes are likely to commit them again.”). 
 9.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
 10.  Id.; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Policing in the Big Apple, HUFFINGTON POST, July 
15, 2014,  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-guthrie-ferguson/big-data-policing-in-the_b_5588009.html 
[hereinafter Ferguson, Big Data] (explaining “certain crimes—burglary, car theft, and theft from auto-
mobiles—are rather dependent on place and opportunity.”). 
 11.  See Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-style: Cutting Edge Data-Driven Analysis Directs 
Los Angeles Patrol Officers to Likely Future Crime Scenes—but Critics Worry that Decision-Making by 
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beyond this rudimentary system of prediction. Many law enforcement 
agencies now use sophisticated computer programs to leverage complex 
algorithms to link and analyze vast datasets, and reveal previously unseen 
crime patterns.12 Police departments use information obtained from these 
statistical analyses to inform their police work.13
Although predictive policing technology has an array of the potential 
uses, the scope of this Note is limited to addressing how the statistical out-
puts from these technologies can be factored into the reasonable suspicion 
calculus to reduce the number of Terry stops14 performed in alleged high-
crime areas. Predictive policing technology can be used to corroborate a 
police officer’s “high-crime area” designation and help restore eroded 
Fourth Amendment protections to these neighborhoods. As the use of so-
phisticated predictive policing software becomes more widespread,15 courts 
will need to address the role that data from this technology plays in corrob-
orating an officer’s finding of reasonable suspicion in alleged high-crime 
areas.16
 Courts all over the United States have struggled to define “high-
crime area” since the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow.17
Wardlow essentially reduced the reasonable suspicion “totality of the cir-
cumstances” analysis to a two-factor test in certain geographic areas: per-
mitting the characterization of a neighborhood as “high-crime” to serve as a 
plus-factor for finding reasonable suspicion.18 However, the Wardlow
Court failed to define the term “high-crime area.”19 Furthermore, the Court 
did not offer any guidance regarding the evidentiary showing necessary to 
 12.  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
 13.  Gordon, supra note 4 (explaining that departments use data outputs to allocate personnel, 
reduce environmental vulnerabilities in neighborhoods, identify future crime hotspots, and generally 
reduce crime and recidivism). 
 14.  Please note that the author uses the terms “stop and frisk” and “Terry Stop” interchangeably 
throughout this Note. A “Terry stop” is a general exception to the rule that a police officer must have 
probable cause to search a suspect. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). A lawful Terry stop 
permits a police officer to perform a brief seizure and partial search of a criminal suspect, when the 
totality of the circumstances leads the officer to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The partial search, or “frisk authority applies only when a concern about 
violence exists.” Fabio Arcila Jr., Nuance, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment: A Response to 
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 63 EMORY L.J. 87, 89 (2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464257 (citation omitted). 
 15.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 
259, 262 (2012). 
16.. See id. at 312.
 17.  528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 18.  See id.
 19.  See Hannah Rose Wisniewski, It’s Time to Define High-Crime: Using Statistics in Court to 
Support an Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime Area” Designation, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
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corroborate a police officer’s assertion that a neighborhood has a high pro-
pensity for crime.20 Lacking guidance, the lower courts have taken a hap-
hazard approach to defining the term “high-crime area,” leading to 
amorphous and inconsistent definitions across jurisdictions.21 Thus, courts 
have generally deferred to a police officer’s subjective belief that an area is 
high-crime, and have not required law enforcement agencies to corroborate 
an officer’s belief with quantitative evidence.22
 The courts’ failure to require law enforcement agencies to present 
concrete evidence demonstrating that a neighborhood has a heightened 
propensity for crime raises significant constitutional concerns. Areas de-
fined as “high-crime” tend to disproportionately represent low-income and 
minority neighborhoods.23 Courts’ deference to police officers’ subjective 
experiences has created significant animosity between the residents of these 
neighborhoods and law enforcement.24 The high-crime label often coin-
cides with an increased police presence in these neighborhoods.25 Moreo-
ver, using the high-crime designation as a plus factor in a two-factor 
totality of the circumstances test, lowers the threshold for reasonable suspi-
cion in these neighborhoods, and ultimately strips residents of critical con-
 20.  See id. 
 21.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605, 1607–08 (2008). 
22.  See id. at 1607–08 (providing examples of the many incantations of high-crime area defini-
tions and the array of evidence offered in various courts to support these definitions); Lenese C. Her-
bert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 
GEO. J. ON POV. L. & POL’Y 135, 136–36 (2002) (explaining that in her experience as an Assistant 
United States Attorney she would question police officers about their high-crime area characterizations 
before trial, and how judges never asked for data to support these assertions in court). 
 23.  David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994); see also David Seawall, Wardlow’s Case: A Call to 
Broaden The Perspective of American Criminal Law, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2001) (stating 
“due to the politics of past and present racism, minority members are often forced to live in poverty-
stricken, crime-riddled communities, and this segregation continues despite race-neutral policies.”).  
24. Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling in New York City: A Panel Discus-
sion with Darius Charney, Jesus Gonzalez, David Kennedy, Noel Leader, and Robert Perry, 14 CUNY
L. REV. 57, 63–64 (2010) (stating “I have not been any place where there is a lot of street action of this 
kind, where a lot of it was not transparently, inherently, flagrantly illegal . . . . Because of all of that, it 
undercuts the legitimacy, especially of the police in these communities and the alternative to having a 
legitimate law enforcement presence in the community is community self-help. And that is part of the 
reason that in these communities we are seeing the growth of a “stop snitching” and vendetta culture, 
because people feel that they have no recourse to law and order to deal with their personal and social 
problems”); see Seawall, supra note 23, at 1131 (explaining that the “high-crime area designation as a 
basis for increased legal justification of police, and the diminished expectations of privacy for residents, 
only perpetuate this distrust and the politics of identification.”).
 25.  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012) (arguing that the War on 
Drugs has led to heavy policing in low-income and minority neighborhoods and ushered in an era of 
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stitutional protections.26 Thus, individuals living in these neighborhoods do 
not enjoy the same level of Fourth Amendment protections as individuals 
residing in wealthier whiter neighborhoods.27
However, the prevalent use of predictive policing software and its in-
creasing sophistication provides courts with an opportunity to narrowly 
define high-crime areas based on both geography and specific crime type. 
Requiring law enforcement to use narrow crime-specific definitions, and 
requiring these agencies to present quantitative evidence that supports these 
designations will help restore eroded Fourth Amendment protections to 
people living in neighborhoods historically stamped with the high-crime 
label. This Note argues that uniform standards and best practices must be 
developed to guide law enforcement’s use of predictive policing software. 
This software should be leveraged as a tool to help restore previously erod-
ed Fourth Amendment rights. 
  Part I briefly describes the development of predictive policing tech-
nologies. It illustrates this technology’s ability to inform high-crime area 
classifications based on both geography and specific crime type, and de-
scribes the relevant limitations of this technology. Part II describes the 
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections for individuals in designated 
high-crime areas since Terry v. Ohio, and focuses on the deterioration of 
the totality of circumstances test into a two-factor test in Illinois v. Ward-
low. It also illustrates how courts have struggled to define the term “high-
crime area.” Part III describes the effect that heavy policing and the high-
crime area label has had on low-income and minority neighborhoods. Part 
IV focuses on the role of technology in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Part V argues that courts must require objective data to evaluate whether an 
area is “high-crime.” It argues that Congress should pass legislation to es-
tablish uniform standards to guide the use of predictive policing technolo-
gies. Implementing uniform standards and best practices would ensure fair, 
accurate, and reliable data collection and analysis, enabling courts to rea-
sonably rely on statistical outputs from these technologies in evidence sup-
pression hearings.
 26.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing 
“High-Crime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 209, 214–15 (2011) [hereinafter Ferguson, Crime Map-
ping].
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND CAPABILITIES OF 
PREDICTIVE POLICING TECHNOLOGIES
CompStat, the precursor to the latest generation of predictive policing 
technologies, emerged in New York in 1994.28 The New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) used CompStat to compile statistical data to show 
when and where different types of crime occurred in the city.29 The NYPD 
used this data to distribute personnel and tailor its policing strategies to 
address these “hotspots” of criminal activity—revolutionizing the NYPD’s 
operations.30 Under the CompStat system, data was collected and analyzed 
weekly, and precinct commanders met every few weeks with the Depart-
ment’s leadership to discuss crime statistics and modify their policing strat-
egies as needed.31 CompStat’s implementation created a constant feedback 
loop for the NYPD and “coincided with a staggering decline in crime” in 
New York City.32 Police departments across the United States began using 
the CompStat system after they learned about the NYPD’s success.33 Alt-
hough experts continue to debate the role of CompStat in facilitating New 
York City’s declining crime rate in the 1990s and early 2000s,34 this soft-
ware paved the way for the development of the latest emerging predictive 
policing technologies, which are used today by law enforcement agencies 
across the United States.35
A. General Overview of New Predictive Policing Technologies 
The development of next generation predictive policing programs has 
garnered not only national attention but also federal financing because of 
the software’s cost-effectiveness, high-tech image, and promising test re-
sults.36 The latest predictive policing programs appear to reduce crime 
 28.  Tina Rosenberg, Armed With Data, Fighting More Than Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/armed-with-data-fighting-more-than-crime/  
(“The ideas in CompStat were first developed by Jack Maple, when he was a lieutenant in the New 
York City Transit Police, as a way to track subway crime and more intelligently deploy transit cops. In 
1994, when William Bratton, the chief of the transit police, became chief of the New York City Police 
Department he brought Maple with him as deputy. They then applied CompStat principles throughout 
the city’s entire crime fighting operation.”). 
 29.  See id.
 30.  See id.
 31.  Id. (noting that before the implementation of CompStat, reports on crimes and arrests were 
turned in every few months). 
 32.  Id. 
33.  See id. (noting that a recent survey by the Police Executive Research Forum “found that 79 
percent of medium to large police departments surveyed use some form of the CompStat model.”). 
34.  Id.
35.  See PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–5. 
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without significantly disrupting other policing efforts in the small geo-
graphic areas where they have been tested.37 Moreover, in an era of signifi-
cant budget cuts, law enforcement agencies are taking advantage of the fact 
that this software seamlessly blends into their existing crime-fighting oper-
ations and saves money by more efficiently allocating resources.38
  Predictive policing technology is built upon the popular understand-
ing that criminals are creatures of habit: they repeatedly commit the same 
types of crimes at around the same time of day in the same geographic 
area.39 Studies have generally shown that certain property crimes, such as 
burglary, are highly predictable.40 Generally, predictive policing models 
rely on an assumption that criminals are rational decision-makers who 
commit crimes by exploiting opportunities created under certain condi-
tions.41 The latest predictive policing software uses “years—sometimes 
decades—worth of crime reports, [and] the algorithm analyses [sic] the 
data to identify areas with high probabilities for certain types of crime, 
placing little red boxes on maps of the city that are streamed into patrol 
cars.”42 Captain John Romero of the Los Angeles Police Department, ex-
plains, “Burglars tend to be territorial, so once they find a neighborhood 
where they get good stuff, they come back again and again . . . [a]nd that 
assists the algorithm in placing the boxes.”43 Historically, the use of predic-
tive policing technologies has been limited to tracking, analyzing, and pre-
dicting property crimes44 because the software was designed to predict 
“where and when crime is mostly likely to occur, not who will commit 
it.”45 However, unlike CompStat, which relied on data of past criminal 
activity to extrapolate patterns and predict future criminal activity, the new 
generation of predictive policing technologies is forward-looking, and truly 
 37.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 38.  Goode, supra note 6. 
 39.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 272 (stating “[i]t is now generally acknowledged that crime does 
not randomly disperse across a geographic area”). 
 40.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–3. 
 41.  Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before it Starts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/local/la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1 (stating “a would-be 
criminal must find a target that is sufficiently vulnerable to attack and that offers an appealing payout. 
An empty house with no alarm on a poorly lighted street, for example, has a much higher chance of 
being burglarized than one with a barking dog on a busy block.”). 
 42.  Berg, supra note 11. 
 43.  Id. PredPol is a popular predictive policing program developed by a private company and is 
being used by law enforcement agencies all over the world. See generally SacBee Online—Predpol 
Results in “Dramatic Crime Reduction”, PREDPOL, Oct. 16, 2013, http://www.predpol.com/sacbee-
online-predpol-results-in-dramatic-crime-reduction/. 
 44.  Gordon, supra note 4. 
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predictive.46 As will be described below, the latest software can analyze 
vast and complex data sets in near real time speeds to reveal previously 
unseen patterns of crimes.47
  As the capabilities of these programs have advanced, police depart-
ments have begun to experiment with using the software to predict other 
types of crimes, such as gun violence and gang activity.48 Although predic-
tive policing technology has many potential uses,49 this Note focuses on 
how this software can be used by law enforcement and the courts to identi-
fy and classify high-crime areas by specific crime type and geography. To 
illustrate how this software works and what it is capable of, the following 
two sections describe two analytic models that are particularly good at 
forecasting where and what type of criminal activity will occur: the near 
repeat model and the risk terrain model (RTM). 
B. The Near Repeat Model 
The near repeat model for predictive policing technology assumes that 
crime spreads through local environments on a micro-scale like a conta-
gious disease.50 Thus, when certain crimes occur at a location, these crimes 
tend to create repeat criminal activity in the same location.51 Professor 
Mohler of Santa Clara University has created an “earthquake modeling” 
algorithm based on this near repeat model.52 The earthquake modeling al-
gorithm draws a grid over a jurisdiction and estimates the background rate 
 46.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 265 n.31. 
 47.  See generally PERRY ET AL., supra note 7 (discussing the various data-mining techniques 
underlying new crime forecasting software). 
 48.  Douglas Belkin, Chicago Hunts for Answers to Gang Killings: Police Build Facebook-Like 
Database to Prevent Swift Cycles of Retaliation, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303644004577520863051001848  
(explaining that Chicago implemented a program tracking the social connections of many of the city’s 
gangs to try to keep them apart in the critical hours after an attack); Can Software that Predicts Crime 
Pass Constitutional Muster?, NPR.ORG (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=205835674 (discussing how Seattle has 
expanded its use of its predictive policing program, PredPol, to predict gun violence in the city); see 
also Gordon, supra note 4. 
 49.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (describing how these technologies are evolving to include 
capabilities such as identifying future offenders, creating offender profiles to match likely offenders 
with future crimes, and identifying potential crime victims); Berg, supra note 11 (describing how 
various law enforcement agencies across the United States are using PredPol as part of their policing 
strategies). 
 50.  G.O. Mohler et al., Self-Exciting Point Process Modeling of Crime, 106 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N,
100, 100 (2011), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20#.VCmY1fldUk0.  
 51.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 277 n.103 (“Research demonstrates that prior victimisation is a 
very good predictor of future risk and that when it occurs, repeat victimisation tends to occur swiftly.”). 
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at which new crime appears in each cell of the grid.53 When a new crime 
occurs in a cell, the algorithm assumes that the rate for the new crime will 
temporarily increase, like an aftershock following an earthquake.54 Over 
time, the rate for new crime declines the longer the cell goes without seeing 
any new crime, similar to how the aftershocks of an earthquake diminish 
over time.55 As one of PredPol’s developers, Jeffrey Brantingham, ex-
plains, “[C]rime hotspots pop up and spread and disappear and pop up 
again in really complicated ways that are just very, very difficult, if not 
impossible, for the individual to intuit.”56 Thus, to ensure accuracy when 
using the near repeat model, agencies must regularly input new data into 
the software because without up-to-date information, the utility of the soft-
ware’s predictions will diminish over time.57
   Software based on the near repeat model has a high-rate of success 
for predicting where and when burglaries are likely to occur in an area.58
Although the near repeat model can accurately predict patterns in property 
crimes, it is unclear whether this model can effectively forecast other types 
of crime, such as gun violence or crimes of passion.59 However, the results 
of one study were promising. The study showed that the near repeat model 
accurately forecasted the location of violent rival-gang related activity.60
These findings support the proposition that in evidence suppression hear-
ings, courts could rely on statistical outputs from predictive policing soft-
ware to evaluate a police officer’s claim that a particular stop-and-frisk 
occurred in a high-crime area. 
C. Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) 
The risk terrain model serves as the foundation for some predictive 
policing software. RTM uses geographic information systems to identify 
geographic features that contribute to elevated crime risk and overlays 
them onto a base map.61 Potential geographic features used to predict crime 
risk in this model include: bars, liquor stores, and strip clubs.62 RTM is akin 
 53.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42. See also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 268 (describing the 
Santa Cruz Police Departments use of Mohler’s software).  
 54.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42. 
 55.  Id.
 56.  Berg, supra note 11. 
 57.  See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 281. 
 58. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42 (detailing studies using near repeat theory to predict 
burglaries).
 59.  Id. at 44. 
 60.  Mohler et al., supra note 50, at 100 (citations omitted). 
 61.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 51. 
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to a base map with layers of tracing paper laid on top of it—as more envi-
ronmental features are plotted on top of each other, clusters of potential 
criminal activity are revealed based on these existing features.63 The mod-
el’s algorithm then makes predictions about an area’s risk for crime based 
on how close the selected geographic location is to identified environmen-
tal features.64
Unlike the near repeat model, the RTM predicts crimes based on the 
interactions between behavioral, social, physical, and environmental fac-
tors, instead of solely using information about where and when past crimi-
nal activity occurred.65 For example, in Morris County, New Jersey, a RTM 
map was created to analyze burglaries.66 The map was generated using five 
variables: “(1) past burglaries, (2) the residential location of individuals 
arrested for theft or burglary between 2009 and 2011, (3) the proximity to 
major highways, (4) the geographic concentration of males between the 
ages of 16 and 24, and (5) the location of apartment complexes and ho-
tels.”67 Morris County police administrators used the map to direct their 
resources to high-risk areas, which led to a general decrease in crime, and 
more specifically, decreases in both violent and property crimes.68 RTM is 
considered genuinely predictive; it forecasts future crime using a location’s 
geographic and environmental attributes rather than relying on data related 
to past criminal activity in that area.69 Hence, software based on RTM 
could potentially be used to accurately forecast potential hotspots for spe-
cific types of criminal activity.  
 Although new predictive policing software has the potential to pre-
cisely define high-crime areas, the models underlying the software have 
limitations. The following section describes the general limitations of pre-
dictive policing technologies. Part V describes how to overcome these limi-
tations to ensure that these technologies produce fair, accurate, and reliable 
data that courts can use to decide whether the high-crime label is appropri-
ate for an area. 
 63.  See id.
 64.  See id.
 65.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 281 (citing Leslie Kennedy et al., Risk Clusters, Hot Spots, and 
Spatial Intelligence: Risk Terrain Modeling as a Algorithm for Police Resource Allocation Strategies,
27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 339, 345–46 (2011)). 
 66.  Id. at 282. 
 67.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 68.  Id. (citations omitted). 
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D. General Limitations of Predictive Policing Technologies 
Although predictive policing software provides law enforcement 
agencies with a powerful tool that can help them efficiently allocate crime 
fighting resources, these technologies have some common limitations. 
First, effective use of predictive policing technologies requires reliability, 
transparency, and accuracy in data collection and analysis; without safe-
guards in place, data is susceptible to human fallibility.70 Second, taken 
alone, predictive policing software cannot establish the requisite level of 
particularized suspicion required to perform a lawful Terry stop (premised 
on reasonable suspicion).71
1. Humans Create Data, Which Leaves it Fallible to Human Error 
Currently, there are no uniform standards or best practices in place to 
guide police departments as they collect the data that will be used as inputs 
for statistical analysis. Data creation requires humans to select what infor-
mation to collect and what information to discard—similar to the old ad-
age, “garbage in, garbage out.”72 An uninformed user may believe that the 
representation of “previously unseen truths” generated by predictive polic-
ing software tells an entirely objective story.73 However, this is not the 
case, because “[d]ata is something we create”74 by making choices about 
what information to collect and the method used to collect it. Thus, police 
departments and courts should proceed cautiously when evaluating the 
statistical outputs from predictive policing algorithms because “[t]he word 
‘data’ connotes fixed numbers inside hard grids of information and as a 
result, it is easily mistaken for fact.”75
  Moreover, humans select the language used to describe data—there 
is no mandatory program in place to guide data classification. Unfortunate-
ly, there is a common misconception that local law enforcement agencies 
are required to conform to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uni-
form Crime Reporting (UCR) Program standards to classify crimes.76
 70.  See Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 10. 
 71.  See Arcila, supra note 14, at 90. 
 72. See Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 10; see also Berg, supra note 11 (writing that one expert 
worries that “there’s too much submissive acceptance of these technologies by the public, without 
consideration of exactly how this data is collected and used.”). 
 73.  Quentin Hardy, Why Big Data is Not Truth, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013,  
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/why-big-data-is-not-truth/. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.
 76.  See Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
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However, when reviewing the UCR Handbook it becomes clear that this 
program is permissive, and the FBI merely recommends that agencies con-
form to its classification system.77 As the FBI explains on its website, 
“[O]ffense definitions may vary from state to state” and the FBI asks 
“agencies to report offenses not according to local or state statutes but ac-
cording to those guidelines provided in the handbook.”78 The FBI notes that 
“[m]ost agencies make a good faith effort to comply with established 
guidelines,”79 however, compliance is not required. Hence, law enforce-
ment agencies have discretion to describe crime data even when reporting 
to the FBI under the UCR Program.80 As such, one might say, the data is 
“only as good as the people using it.”81
Moreover, critics of predictive policing technologies suggest that data-
driven policing may create “self-fulfilling cycles of bias” for police de-
partments using this information to make resource allocation decisions.82
For example, if statistical outputs suggest that a neighborhood is a “high-
crime area”, a law enforcement agency may police that area more heavily 
than others. This increased police presence may in turn generate more ar-
rests in the neighborhood because of the increased crime detection capaci-
ty. Thus, when new arrest data is added to the predictive policing software, 
it may reinforce a department’s original prediction by directing crime-
fighting resources to an area that is already heavily policed. The algorithm 
then gives the impression that there are heightened levels of criminal activi-
ty in that neighborhood, when in reality, more criminals are getting caught 
because there are more police officers present to detect crime.83 Heightened 
police presence in a neighborhood can lead to more stop-and-frisks and 
skew the data, so it appears that one neighborhood has a higher crime rate 
than other areas.84 Thus, without safeguards in place, data analytics and 
 77.  A Word About UCR Data, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/word (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 78.  Id.
 79.  Id.
 80.  See id.
 81.  Hardy, supra note 75. 
 82.  Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuit of Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-crime/. 
 83.  Id.; see Berg, supra note 11 (quoting Jennifer Lynch, senior staff attorney at the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, who says that with these technologies “what we forget is that the information that 
went in may have been subject to bias . . . may have been collected in certain communities more than 
other communities. The problem is technology legitimizes somehow the problematic policing that was 
the origination of the data to begin with.”).  
 84.  See Berg, supra note 11; Sengupta, supra note 82; see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25 
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data collection are susceptible to human fallibility. “Predictive policing can 
be a very useful tool, but it is just that—a tool. It is not a crystal ball.”85
2. Predictive Policing Technologies Cannot Establish Particularized   
Suspicion that Criminal Activity is Afoot 
Under the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis, perform-
ing a lawful stop-and-frisk of a suspect requires police officers to have a 
particularized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.86 In order to justify a 
Terry stop, an officer needs to observe a person acting suspiciously.87 Be-
cause predictive policing software uses probabilities to predict when and 
where criminal activity is likely to occur,88 a police officer cannot use the 
statistical data derived from this software as his sole basis for justifying a 
Terry stop. In other words, these technologies can provide generalized pre-
dictions of criminal activity but they cannot establish the requisite particu-
larized suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
suspicion calculus. For example, Seattle’s PredPol software predicted that a 
robbery would unfold in a “tiny patch of downtown that is dotted with liq-
uor stores and loiterers.”89 A robbery occurred in the area as predicted. 
However, “not one that a computer program could have predicted: a thief 
walked into a Chinese restaurant and made off with a live crab.”90
As one expert laments, “[T]echnology such as predictive policing cre-
ates ‘categorical suspicion’ of people in predicted crime areas, which can 
lead to unnecessary questioning or excessive stopping-and-searching.”91
Thus, reliance on statistical outputs from predictive policing technologies 
must be limited to helping an officer develop a generalized suspicion about 
imminent criminal activity.92 An officer still needs to observe a specific 
person behaving suspiciously in order to perform a lawful Terry stop in an 
alleged high-crime area.93 The concepts of particularized suspicion and the 
reasonable suspicion calculus are described in more detail below. 
 85.  PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 7. 
86. See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of 
the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 101–02 (1999). 
 87.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 27 (1968). 
 88.  Berg, supra note 11. 
 89.  Sengupta, supra note 82. 
 90.  Id.
 91.  Berg, supra note 11. 
 92.  See Arcila, supra note 14, at 90. 
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II. FROM TERRY TO WARDLOW: ERODING FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS IN AMORPHOUS HIGH-CRIME AREAS
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . ,”94 and requires police officers to conform to a “a 
standard of reasonableness” when engaging with private individuals “to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions . . . .”95 However, the Supreme Court has chipped away at this consti-
tutional protection since its groundbreaking decision in Terry v. Ohio in 
1968.96 The Terry Court carved out an exception to the probable cause 
requirement for searches and seizures, and developed a new threshold 
standard of reasonable suspicion.97 In 2000, the Court further weakened 
Fourth Amendment protections in Illinois v. Wardlow, where an ambigu-
ously defined “high-crime area” designation was permitted to serve as one 
of only two factors in finding reasonable suspicion to perform a lawful 
Terry stop.98 In the wake of Wardlow, lower courts have struggled to define 
high-crime areas in evidence suppression hearings. 
A. Terry v. Ohio (1968): The Origins of the “Terry Stop,” the Totality 
of the Circumstances Analysis, and the Path to “High-Crime Area”      
Designations
Terry v. Ohio established the reasonable suspicion standard. Under the 
reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer may perform a lawful “Terry 
stop,” a brief seizure and a partial search of a criminal suspect, when the 
totality of the circumstances lead the officer to believe criminal activity is 
afoot.99 The totality of the circumstances test uses an objective standard to 
assess what a trained police officer would reasonably believe in the context 
of a specific stop.100 A police officer must “point to specific and articulable 
facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, rea-
sonably warrant that intrusion.”101 The test is a “practical, nontechnical 
 94.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
95.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citations omitted).
 96.  392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 97.  See generally id.
 98.  See generally 528 U.S. 119. 
 99.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 100.  See Raymond, supra note 86, at 102. 
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conception”102 balancing direct observations of a suspect’s behavior and the 
entire context of a stop to establish particularized suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.103 In order to perform a lawful Terry stop, an officer needs 
more than a “hunch”; he must directly observe suspicious behavior.104 The 
officer must demonstrate that actions of the suspect somehow “distin-
guish[ed] that individual from the larger universe of law-abiding citi-
zens.”105 Moreover, “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and 
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”106
Thus, the Terry Court viewed this new reasonable suspicion standard as 
carving out “limited exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the per-
son require probable cause to arrest.”107
  There are two scenarios in which lawful Terry stops arise. The first 
type of Terry stop occurs when an officer fears imminent danger to himself, 
and the context in which, the Terry Court envisioned these stops would 
occur.108 In this situation, an officer can conduct an over the clothes pat 
down of a suspect limited to a search for weapons.109 The second scenario, 
developed after the Terry decision;110it arises when an officer observes a 
suspect’s behavior and believes that a specific type of criminal activity is 
afoot based on these observations.111 In this scenario, an officer’s search 
should be limited to frisking for evidence related to the specific suspected 
 102.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
176 (1949)). 
 103.  See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (stating “[b]ased upon that whole 
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity.”). 
 104.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against 
police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the 
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.”). 
 105.  Raymond, supra note 86, at 101–02. 
 106.  Terry 392 U.S. at 10, 17 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., 
concurring)).
 107.  Florida. v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). 
 108.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. 
 109.  Officer McFadden had reasonable suspicion to believe that Terry was armed and dangerous 
and planning to rob a store because McFadden watched three men (including Terry) “pace alternately 
along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each com-
pletion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner . . . ” 
Id.
 110. When Chief Justice Warren wrote the Terry opinion, he was concerned about potential abuses 
of the power; he tried to prevent abuses of the power to stop-and-frisk by limiting the scope of the 
searches to an officer’s fear of imminent danger to himself if he does not stop-and-frisk a suspect. Id. at 
10, 17–19. Later decisions expanded the scope of Terry. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 
(1985); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 241 (5th ed. 2009).  
 111.  See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227–28; WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 241 
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criminal activity.112 For example, a police officer observes members of 
Hell’s Angels outside of a motorcycle shop; after observing their behavior, 
the officer suspects that they intend to rob the shop. An officer may lawful-
ly perform a limited, over the clothes frisk for a commercial grade lock 
cutter or other typical burglary tools.113
  Terry stops performed under the purview of the second scenario can 
be problematic. When Chief Justice Warren wrote the Terry opinion, he 
recognized that the seizure of a person is more than a “mere minor incon-
venience and petty indignity[;]” rather, it “is a serious intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong 
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”114 He pointed to then-
current police scholarship to underscore his concerns that police officers 
may abuse their authority to stop-and-frisk, and use it as a means to main-
tain the image of police power and control in a neighborhood.115 Chief 
Justice Warren’s hypothetical concerns about law enforcement abusing the 
power to stop-and-frisk in the Terry stop context recently became reality in 
New York City.  
The NYPD has been accused of targeting certain demographics (i.e., 
young minority men) and performing excessive stop-and-frisks.116A fact 
sheet created by the New York Civil Liberties Union observes, “though 
they account for only 4.7% of the city’s population, black and Latino males 
between the ages of 14–24 accounted for 41.6 [percent] of the stops in 
2011,” and that “[t]he number of stops of young black men exceeded the 
entire city population of young black men.”117 Studies of the NYPD’s stop-
and-frisk reports have shown that a disproportionate number of minority 
persons have been stopped-and-frisked with a very small number of these 
searches leading to arrests.118 In 2000, Wardlow further minimized the re-
quired nexus between observed behavior and specific crime type when the 
Supreme Court allowed the characterization of a neighborhood as a high-
 112.  Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227–28. 
 113.  Interview with Professor Douglas Godfrey, Professor of Legal Research & Writing, Chicago-
Kent Coll. of Law, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 1, 2013). 
 114.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 10, 17. 
 115.  Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 334 (2013). 
 116.  See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK: REPORT ON 2011 FINDINGS, available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/stopandfrisk-factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 117.  Id.
 118.  Id. (stating “[n]ine out of 10 people stopped are totally innocent, meaning they are neither 
arrested nor ticketed.”); see also The Editorial Board, More Disclosures About Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y.
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crime area to serve as one of only two factors in the totality of the circum-
stances test.119
B. Illinois v. Wardlow (2000): The Totality of Circumstances Test   
Becomes a Two-Factor Test Giving Rise to the Amorphous                
“High-Crime Area” Label 
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court explicitly declared that the 
designation of a neighborhood as a “high-crime area” could serve as one of 
two required factors in the totality of the circumstances test.120 The Court 
explained that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteris-
tics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently 
suspicious to warrant further investigation,” and that past precedent permit-
ted this finding.121 Hence, a police officer met the threshold requirement for 
reasonable suspicion when he stop-and-frisked Sam Wardlow based on two 
factors: (1) Mr. Wardlow’s presence in a known narcotics trafficking area 
(i.e., high-crime area), and (2) his “unprovoked flight upon noticing the 
police.”122
  By relying solely on these two factors to find reasonable suspicion, the 
Wardlow Court dramatically expanded the role that neighborhood character 
could play in the totality of the circumstances analysis. By giving the high-
crime area label significant weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus, the 
Court weakened the required nexus between particularized suspicion and 
suspected criminal activity.123 The Court effectively bifurcated Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence by according people two different levels of 
Fourth Amendment protections based on their geographic location.124
  If an individual behaves ambiguously in a designated “high-crime 
area,” he is more likely to be stopped-and-frisked because of his presence 
in this area than a person who behaves similarly in a neighborhood without 
the high-crime label.125 Under Wardlow, standing in an area labeled as 
high-crime is enough to create a generalized suspicion of criminal wrong-
 119.  See generally 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 120.  See id. at 124. 
 121.  Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972)). 
 122.  See id.
 123.  See Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 214–15. 
 124.  See id.
125.  See Raymond, supra note 86, at 99–102, 115–24 (describing case law showing that whether 
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doing.126 When a person’s presence in a high-crime area is coupled with an 
ambiguous activity, such as standing on a street corner in the Englewood 
neighborhood of Chicago holding a plastic bag, officers are more likely to 
interpret ambiguous conduct as indicative of criminal wrongdoing.127
Whereas, standing on a corner and talking to someone while holding a 
plastic bag in the wealthy Gold Coast neighborhood of Chicago will likely 
not elicit the same response from the police.128 Many Wardlow critics have 
questioned whether Wardlow’s presence on a street corner holding a plastic 
bag was any more indicative of criminal activity than the actions of the 
other 98,000 people living in the same district.129
  Although the Wardlow decision has significantly weakened the 
Fourth Amendment protections provided to individuals living in areas la-
beled as high-crime, the Wardlow Court did recognize that neighborhood 
character alone could not justify an officer’s finding of reasonable suspi-
cion.130 The totality of the circumstances test still requires a police officer 
to have a particularized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; this factor 
of particularized suspicion appears to carry more weight than the factor of 
neighborhood character.131 Thus, taken alone, an individual’s mere pres-
ence in a high-crime area without indicia that he is engaged in criminal 
activity would not be enough to justify a stop-and-frisk.132 However, be-
cause the Supreme Court failed to offer a definition for the “high-crime 
area” label or provide guidance to lower courts regarding the evidence 
required to prove that an area is indeed high-crime,133 courts have struggled 
to develop socially just standards that offer equal levels of Fourth Amend-
ment protections to everyone, regardless of a person’s geographic location. 
 126.  See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 301–03 (describing the ambiguity involved in Wardlow and 
the confusing results of creating an unclear standard for individualized suspicion); Ferguson, Crime
Mapping, supra note 26, at 215 (describing how the NYPD conducted 52,000 stop-and-frisks in 
Brownsville, Brooklyn an area with a population of 14,000 between 2006 and 2010); Raymond, supra 
note 86, at 99–102, 115–24. 
 127. Id.
 128.  See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 301–03. 
 129.  Id.
 130. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 (1979)) (“An individual’s 
presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, 
particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime”).  
 131.  See id. (giving more attention to Wardlow’s unprovoked flight upon seeing the police officers 
than his presence in a high-crime area). 
 132.  Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (establishing reasonable suspicion requires more than 
a person’s mere presence in a designated high-crime area). 
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C. Post-Wardlow: The Vague High-Crime Area Label Mucks Up 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Wardlow Court did not establish a clear definition for “high-crime 
area” or the criteria to use to evaluate the character of an area.134 Courts all 
over the United States “began labeling areas as ‘high-crime’ without set-
tling on a definition” or using a uniform method to determine whether an 
area is high-crime.135 The absence of a uniform approach to evaluating 
neighborhood character has led jurisdictions to haphazardly define and 
classify high-crime areas.136 For example, some courts describe high-crime 
areas as locations of known drug activity or locations under police surveil-
lance.137 Others will accept an officer’s subjective belief that an area is 
high-crime without requiring him to offer facts corroborating his testimo-
ny.138 Other courts have labeled an “area of expected criminal activity”139
as high-crime without requiring any data to support this claim.140
  Generally, courts have been deferential to the government’s high-
crime classifications.141 Courts typically do not require the government to 
present quantitative evidence to support its classifications, even though 
advancements in crime-mapping technologies have made it possible for 
police departments to analyze actual reported crime levels in specific geo-
graphic areas and compare crime rates across jurisdictions.142 Crime maps 
and analysts’ reports are rarely introduced in court to prove that a Terry 
stop actually occurred in a high-crime area.143 For example, in United 
States v. Baskin, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the argument that 
the government must produce “specific data” to establish that a location is 
 134.  See generally Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
135.  See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 21, at 1605, 1607–08 (providing examples of the array 
of definitions for the term “high-crime area” and evidence offered to support these definitions in differ-
ent courts); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218–20 (3d Cir. 2004) (Smith, J., concur-
ring) (raising questions about how judges should evaluate the definition and evidence put forth to 
establish a high-crime area).
 136.  See Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 203–06. 
 137.  Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 21, at 1605 (citing State v. Biehl, No. 22054, 2004 WL 
2806340, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004).
 138.  Id. at 1608. 
 139.  Id. at 1605. 
 140.  See id. (citing United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
 141.  See id. at 1605–07. 
 142.  Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 182 (stating, “There is no longer a statistical 
question about which areas in fact have higher levels of crime. Maps can be created detailing the last 
twenty auto thefts in a given neighborhood, the last three months of drug arrests within a city or the 
locations of all the homicides committed in a given year.”). 
 143.  Id. at 198 (indicating that over 1,000 federal and state cases have used the term “high-crime 
area” in the context of Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion without a consistent or sophisticated 
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a “high-crime area.”144 The court held that the location of Baskin’s unpro-
voked flight remained a relevant factor because the Terry stop occurred 
near a “newly discovered” methamphetamine lab in a county park.145 The 
court accepted the Government’s decision to designate a park as a high-
crime area without requiring the Government to present any actual data to 
support its assertion.146
  The lack of rigor used to establish an objective basis for defining an 
area as high-crime has frustrated some judges.147 Many judges and scholars 
have expressed their concern about the continued erosion of Fourth 
Amendment protections in neighborhoods haphazardly designated as high-
crime.148 For example, the majority opinion in United States v. Montero-
Carmargo stated that the court must be careful that the high-crime label 
does not just blanket communities “in which members of minority groups 
regularly go about their daily business, but is limited to specific, circum-
scribed locations where particular crimes occur with unusual regularity.”149
  Although the Montero-Carmargo Court expressed that it wanted to 
exercise caution when applying the high-crime label, it failed to employ 
this rigor.150 Judge Kozinski criticizes the majority for deferring to the two 
arresting officers’ perception of an area as high-crime as sufficient to label 
it as such.151 He warns, “to rely on every cop’s repertoire of war stories to 
determine what is a ‘high crime area’—and on that basis to treat otherwise 
innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion—strikes me as an 
invitation to trouble.”152 Judge Kozinski further laments: 
The question is not whether the characteristics of the area may be taken 
into account, but how these characteristics are established. In our first 
opinion to interpret this language from Wardlow, the majority adopts a 
 144.  401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 145.  Id.
 146.  See id.
 147.  See United States v. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring).
 148.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 302 n.259 (citing David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspi-
cion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994)); Lenese C. 
Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 135–38 (2002); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to 
Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214, 255–56 (1983); Raymond, supra note 86, at 116–24; Amy D. 
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 
384–85 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 405 (2003); Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person 
Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 358 (2001)). 
 149.  208 F.3d at 1138. 
 150.  See id.
 151.  Id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
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methodology for establishing the characteristics of the area that is about 
as rigorous as the recipe for Leftovers Casserole.153
III. LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS ARE 
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTED BY HEAVY POLICING AND FREQUENT
STOP-AND-FRISKS
Continuing to permit law enforcement agencies to rely on ambiguous 
definitions of high-crime areas comes at a significant cost to the people 
who live in these neighborhoods. As noted previously, the high-crime label 
tends to attach to hypersegregated, low-income, minority neighborhoods 
across the United States.154 Many of these neighborhoods became saturated 
with police officers when the United States began its War on Drugs during 
the Reagan Administration.155 Heavy policing of these low income-
minority neighborhoods has led to a disproportionate number of people of 
color being stopped-and-frisked.156 The Wardlow Court’s transformation of 
the reasonable suspicion totality of the circumstances test into a two-factor 
test, has made it even easier for police officers to justify Terry stops in 
these alleged high-crime areas because courts are deferential to police of-
ficers’ subjective beliefs about elevated crime rates in particular neighbor-
hoods.157 Thus, the reduction of the reasonable suspicion test into a two-
factor test, and the structural racism built into our criminal justice system 
has helped fuel a culture of mass incarceration, and has disproportionately 
affected low-income minority neighborhoods.158
Mass incarceration refers to the American cultural phenomenon of 
“the imprisonment of comparatively and historically high proportions of 
the population that cannot be accounted for by changes in crime rates.”159
Currently, the United States “has the largest reported incarcerated popula-
tion in the world, and by far the highest rate of imprisonment.”160 The 
153. Id.
 154.  Harris, supra note 23, at 677–78; Seawall, supra note 23, at 1131.
 155.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 72–96. 
 156.  See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 116 (detailing the number of stop-and-frisks 
performed by NYPD in recent years). 
 157.  See generally 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 158.  See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25.  
 159.  MARLA MCDANIEL ET AL., URBAN INST., IMPRISONMENT AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF 
DISCONNECTED LOW-INCOME MEN 1 (Aug. 2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412986-Imprisonment-and-Disenfranchisement-of-Disconnected-
Low-Income-Men.pdf. 
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number of prisoners in both federal and state facilities has increased by 
nearly 430 percent between 1979 and 2009.161 Moreover, “[r]acial dispari-
ties in imprisonment rates are striking. For every 100,000 Americans in 
each race or gender group, there are 478 white males, 3,023 black males, 
51 white females, and 129 black females incarcerated in state or federal 
prison.”162 Undeniably, people of color are disproportionately overrepre-
sented in the criminal justice system.163
 In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander describes how the War on 
Drugs and the structural racism embedded in our criminal justice system 
have devastated low-income minority communities across the United 
States.164 The culture of heavy policing created by the War on Drugs in 
low-income minority neighborhoods has fostered significant animosity 
between the police and residents of these neighborhoods.165 Alexander 
observes that even though studies show that rates of drug use are similar 
across races, each year a disproportionate number of African American 
men are swept into the criminal justice system for low-level drug offenses 
because of racially biased police discretion.166
  Many scholars and law enforcement agencies have tried to justify 
heavily policing low-income minority neighborhoods by arguing that resi-
dents of these communities are more likely to engage in illegal activity 
outdoors and in plain sight than in higher-income areas.167 These agencies 
argue that concentrating drug enforcement efforts in these neighborhoods 
enables them to efficiently allocate resources while combating illegal activ-
ity.168 However, unlike their wealthier neighbors who would not tolerate 
heavy policing, residents of low-income minority neighborhoods often lack 
power in our political system, leaving them vulnerable to this biased polic-
ing.169 As Alexander notes, “[H]ypersegregation . . . has made the round-up 
easy. Confined to ghetto areas and lacking political power, the black poor 
 161.  Id.
 162.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 163.  MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 159 (noting that “the U.S. Department of Justice is reviewing 
laws and agency enforcement policies that may have had a disparate impact on African Americans and 
Hispanics, both in terms of incarceration and the collateral damage to their families and communities.”). 
 164.  See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25. 
 165.  Id. at 125 (describing how “[t]he militarized nature of law enforcement in ghetto communities 
has inspired rap artists and black youth to refer to the police presence in black communities as ‘The 
Occupation.’”).
 166.  Id. at 123. Alexander notes that recent studies suggest that white youth are more likely to 
participate in illegal drug dealing than people of color. Id. at 99 (citation omitted). 
 167.  Id. at 125. 
 168.  Id.





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 169 Side A      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P11 - KOSS (WITH CHANGES, POSSIBLY CHANGING PAGINATION).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2015 9:41 AM
2015] PREDICTIVE POLICING 323 
are convenient targets.”170
  Heavy policing of these low-income neighborhoods has created an 
expectation among residents, particularly among young black men, that 
they will “be stopped, interrogated, and frisked numerous times in the 
course of a month, or even a single week.”171 In her book, Alexander shares 
a story from a law student who participated in a ride-along with a Chicago 
police officer. The student described how, “[e]ach time we drove into a 
public housing project and stopped the car, every young black man in the 
area would almost reflexively place his hands up against the car and spread 
his legs to be searched.”172 These regular encounters with law enforcement 
are problematic because they often function as “the gateway into the crimi-
nal justice system” for non-violent, low-level offenses such as marijuana 
possession.173
Arrests for low-level non-violent offenses have created a climate 
where “a staggering 5.1 million people [are] under ‘community correction-
al supervision’—i.e., on probation or parole.”174 Moreover, an individual 
does not even need to be convicted of a crime to be barred from gainful 
employment, access to public housing or other public assistance—getting 
arrested is enough to essentially lock someone out of mainstream socie-
ty.175 Once a person has been swept into the criminal justice system, it is 
difficult to get out.176 Scholar, Loïc Wacquant has described this phenome-
non “of people cycling in and out of prison” and “trapped by their second-
class status” as a “closed circuit of perpetual marginality.”177 Thus, requir-
ing narrower definitions of high-crime areas could reduce the number of 
Terry stops that occur in these neighborhoods. Reducing the number of 
Terry stops occurring in these neighborhoods may, in turn, reduce the 
number of young minority men who are swept into the criminal justice 
system’s “closed circuit of perpetual marginality” for committing low-
level, non-violent offenses.178
 170.  Id.
 171.  Id. at 124–25. 
 172.  Id. at 125. 
 173.  See id. at 136. 
174.  See id. at 94 (citation omitted) (noting that approximately 2.3 million people were in prisons 
or jails as of 2008). 
 175.  Id. at 144–77. 
 176.  See id.
 177.  Id. at 95 (citing Loïc Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar Institution’: On the Prison as Surrogate 
Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377, 384 (2000)). 
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IV. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The courts have not only struggled with defining high-crime areas and 
applying Wardlow, they have also had difficulty evaluating the role that 
emerging technologies should play in Fourth Amendment analyses. In re-
cent years, technology has become increasingly complex and judges have 
had trouble staying abreast of the latest developments. As Judge Posner 
lamented in his book, Reflections on Judging, “Federal judges are on the 
whole not well adapted by training or experience to the technological age 
that we live in.”179 However, as new technologies develop, the courts must 
figure out how to embrace these technological advancements because the 
“law must apply itself to the life of a society driven more and more by 
technology and technological improvements.”180
   The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case specifically addressing 
the use of predictive policing technology; however, past cases have re-
quired the Court to strike a balance between permitting law enforcement to 
use emerging technologies and safeguarding Americans’ Fourth Amend-
ment protections.181 For example, when deciding whether police officers’ 
use of a thermal imaging device constituted an unlawful search of a private 
home in Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia wrote, “[I]t would be foolish 
to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”182
In this case, police officers suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in 
his home and used a thermal imager to determine if the heat emanating 
from his home was consistent with the high intensity heat lamps typically 
required to grow marijuana.183
  Although Justice Scalia recognized that the technology of the particu-
lar device used by the officers was “crude,”184 he acknowledged that as 
technology evolves, these devices have the potential to reveal all human 
activity in the home.185 Anticipating that significant technological ad-
 179.  RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 78 (2013).  
 180.  Id. at 54 (quoting Judge Hamilton). 
 181.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (discussing electronic signal transmis-
sions and physical trespass); see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (stating that the 
question presented to the Court “is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the 
realm of guaranteed privacy”); see generally Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) 
(discussing the EPA’s use of high-resolution aerial photography). 
 182.  533 U.S. at 29, 33–34. 
 183.  Id. at 29–30. 
 184.  Id. at 36. 
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vancement was on the horizon, the Court ruled that the use of thermal im-
aging devices constituted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.186 Moreover, writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected a 
case-by-case approach to deciding whether a law enforcement agency’s use 
of an emerging technology was lawful.187 Justice Scalia reasoned that be-
fore a law enforcement agency uses new technology as part of its policing 
efforts, it must know whether the use of such technology is lawful, so the 
agency can adjust its policing strategies accordingly.188
  The Court’s reasoning in a 2014 case, Riley v. California, further il-
lustrates the Court’s preference for using a long-term and uniform approach 
to evaluating the role of new technologies in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.189 The question presented to the Court in Riley was whether the 
police may perform a warrantless search of the digital information on a cell 
phone seized from a person who was lawfully arrested.190 Writing for the 
Court, Chief Justice Roberts focused on the sophistication of emerging 
technologies, such as the smartphone, and highlighted the pervasiveness of 
technology in our society.191 He observed how quickly this technology has 
evolved, citing a Pew Research Center Study from 2013, and noting that 
even the outdated flip phone technology of one of the arrestees, had “been 
around for less than 15 years.”192
  After describing the sophistication and prevalence of these 
smartphones in our daily lives, the Court rejected the Government’s argu-
ments for permitting warrantless cell phone searches.193 Chief Justice Rob-
erts describes the Court’s “general preference to provide clear guidance to 
law enforcement through categorical rules.”194 Quoting Michigan v. Sum-
mers, the Court reasoned, “If police are to have workable rules, the balanc-
ing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a 
categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual 
police officers.’”195 In order to ensure that law enforcement agencies under-
 186.  See id. at 35–36, 40. 
 187.  Id. at 38–39. 
 188.  See id.
189.  See generally 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 190.  Id. at 2480.
 191.  Id. at 2484 (stating, “These cases require us to decide how the search incident to arrest doc-
trine applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that 
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude that they were an important feature of human anato-
my.”). 
 192.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 193.  Id. at 2491. 
 194.  Id.
 195.  Id. at 2491–92 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (quoting Duna-
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stand how they may lawfully use the technology on which they rely, they 
need clear categorical rules delineating these parameters—even for emerg-
ing technologies. 
As Judge Posner further observes in his book, new technologies that 
rely on complex mathematical models and statistical analyses can be par-
ticularly difficult for judges to understand when compared with technolo-
gies of the past, such as the steam engine or the automobile.196 He explains 
that compared to the latest emerging technologies, even when technologies 
of the past were complex, it was easier to explain how they worked to 
judges who did not possess a technical background.197 Evaluating emerging 
technologies places judges who do not have technical or scientific back-
grounds in uncomfortable territory because they must make sense of “the 
kinds of variable[s] that science measures” rather than the soft variables 
they are accustomed to in the courtroom.198
Judges’ reluctance to embrace new technology and rely on quantita-
tive data in evidence suppression hearings can be seen in courtrooms across 
the country. As discussed previously, courts have been reluctant to rely on 
the statistical data that parties have offered as evidence to prove or disprove 
a police officer’s assertion that he performed a Terry stop in a high-crime 
area.199 However, as predictive policing technologies become increasingly 
popular and become an essential law enforcement tool, the courts will not 
be able to ignore the existence of these sophisticated technologies. 
In order for law enforcement agencies to fully integrate this technolo-
gy into their daily policing strategies and avoid running afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment, these agencies need guidance from the courts. Moreover, as 
law enforcement begins to increasingly rely on this technology, Americans 
will expect courts to integrate the statistical outputs from these technolo-
gies into their reasoning to ensure that individuals’ constitutional rights are 
protected. Thus, courts must acknowledge the role of these emerging tech-
nologies in law enforcement activities and begin to responsibly integrate 
quantitative data into their decision-making processes. 
 196.  POSNER, supra note 179, at 72. 
 197.  See id. at 71–72, 78 (using members of the current Supreme Court as examples, Judge Posner 
points to the fact that none of them have a graduate or undergraduate degree in a technical field to 
illuminate this lack of technical training). 
 198.  Id. at 73.
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V. STANDARDIZING PREDICTIVE POLICING TECHNOLOGIES TO 
ENSURE FAIRNESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
A 2012 survey by the FBI identified 14,006 law enforcement agencies 
across the United States, which employ 670,439 full-time law enforcement 
officers.200 As predictive policing technologies continue to evolve and 
technology becomes increasingly integrated into all aspects of our lives, it 
is likely that the United States’ roughly 14,000 law enforcement agencies 
and their 670,439 officers will choose to incorporate this software into their 
day-to-day operations and decision-making processes. In fact, 
“[j]urisdictions as diverse as Palm Beach County, Florida; Memphis, Ten-
nessee; Chicago, Illinois; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Dallas, Texas, are 
testing predictive policing” software.201 As the use of predictive policing 
software becomes more widespread, it will become impossible for judges 
to ignore quantitative data in the courtroom.202 Judges will no longer be 
able to defer to police officers’ subjective experiences when defining high-
crime areas.203
Therefore, mandatory uniform standards and best practices must be 
established to ensure that the information produced by predictive policing 
technologies is fair, accurate, reliable and transparent. Congress should call 
on the FBI to establish these uniform standards and best practices, and 
oversee the implementation of these technologies across law enforcement 
agencies. Creating uniform standards will enable the 14,000 law enforce-
ment agencies in the United States to responsibly rely on these technologies 
in their day-to-day work. Having the FBI develop and implement these 
standards will also enable judges to reasonably rely on data from these 
programs when deciding whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to 
perform a Terry stop in an alleged high-crime area.204 Most importantly, 
integrating quantitative data into the reasonable suspicion analysis will help 
 200.  Table 74: 2012 Full-time Law Enforcement Employees, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/74tabledatadecoverviewpdfs/table_74_full_time_law_enforcement_employees_by_populati
on_group_percent_male_and_female_2012.xls (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (noting that this statistic 
includes both sworn officers and civilian employees). 
 201.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 268–69. 
 202.  See Wisniewski, supra note 20, at 105–06. 
 203.  See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 21, at 1608. 
 204.  The author recognizes that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (often referred to as the 
Daubert factors) plays a critical role in the admissibility and reliability of technical evidence in the 
courtroom; however, this discussion is beyond the purview of this note. This note assumes that these 
predictive policing programs will use reliable methods to generate data and establish high-crime areas, 
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restore eroded Fourth Amendment protections to people living in heavily 
policed neighborhoods. 
A. Utilize the FBI to Coordinate and Oversee Predictive Policing 
Technologies
Congress should pass legislation requiring the FBI to create mandato-
ry uniform standards and best practices to guide law enforcement agencies 
in their use of predictive policing technologies. The FBI is the appropriate 
agency to develop these guidelines and to oversee law enforcement agen-
cies across the country for a variety of reasons. 
First, as an agency under the umbrella of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, the FBI collects an array of information about crime and 
other relevant law enforcement topics, demonstrating the FBI’s high-level 
of institutional competence in this area.205 For example, the FBI already 
uses the information it gathers to generate reports that American law en-
forcement agencies can use to guide their crime fighting strategies in areas 
as diverse as terrorism and white-collar crime.206 Because the FBI has the 
capacity to serve as a clearinghouse for information, it is well suited to 
develop best practices for collecting and analyzing data. 
  Second, providing oversight and establishing best practices for the 
use of predictive policing technologies in municipal police departments, 
aligns with both the FBI’s mission, and its goal of combating public cor-
ruption and protecting civil rights.207 The FBI’s mission is “to uphold and 
enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership 
and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international 
agencies and partners.”208 Requiring the FBI to develop mandatory uniform 
standards will help the FBI further its mission because the Bureau will lead 
the way by developing fair and appropriate technology-based policing 
strategies. Moreover, the FBI will further its goals of combating public 
corruption and protecting civil rights by helping local law enforcement 
agencies understand the limitations of these technologies.209 Creating data-
 205.  See Reports and Publications, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 206.  See id. One example of the FBI’s efforts to serve as a clearinghouse for information was 
illustrated earlier: the efforts of the FBI to develop uniform crime reporting across the United States. 
See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 76. 
 207. Quick Facts, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
 208.  Id.
 209.  The FBI may help police departments understand that past data may lose its predictive value 
if an environmental vulnerability is remediated and changes crime patterns in an area. For example, if 
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neutral policies for local law enforcement to follow will minimize the risk 
of unreliable and inaccurate data collection and analysis, and help safe-
guard Americans’ Fourth Amendment protections. 
Third, the FBI is well-equipped to provide neutral third-party over-
sight because the agency has an extensive and reputable community out-
reach program.210 Over time, the Bureau has formed many successful 
partnerships with law enforcement agencies in the United States and 
around the globe.211 The FBI often calls upon former graduates of its Na-
tional Academy to help train police officers and build interagency relation-
ships to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement operations.212 Thus, 
the FBI is already a well-established and well-respected organization capa-
ble of working in unison with the 14,000 agencies around the country to 
develop mandatory standards and best practices to ensure the responsible 
use of predictive policing technology. 
B. Establish Mandatory Uniform Standards and Oversight to Ensure 
Fairness, Accuracy, Reliability and Transparency 
Establishing mandatory uniform standards that: guide how data is col-
lected and entered into predictive policing programs, provide for routine 
audits of local law enforcement’s predictive policing systems, and guide 
how algorithms are written, will significantly decrease potential risks asso-
ciated with human fallibility in big data collection.213 Having the FBI im-
plement uniform standards will help safeguard against “[b]lind reliance on 
the forecast, divorced from the reason for the forecast”214 in police depart-
ments’ use of predictive policing technologies. 
First, new mandatory standards should prescribe procedures that en-
sure data is systematically gathered and entered into the software on a regu-
lar basis. Developing a uniform system for data collection and entry will 
reinforce the accuracy of the system’s algorithms, maximize their objective 
predictive utility, and help guard against human bias. After all, “[i]f the 
members who were stealing the cars, then the predictive value of the data outputs from the predictive 
policing software will diminish because these environmental vulnerabilities have been addressed. See
Ferguson, supra note 15, at 314. 
 210.  See Partnerships and Outreach, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/partnerships_and_outreach/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (listing FBI partnerships and describing its 
community outreach program). 
 211.  See id.
 212.  The FBI Academy, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/training/national-academy/national-academy (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (describing the purpose of 
the National Academy and the training it offers to local leaders in law enforcement). 
 213.  Refer to Part I of this note for an in-depth discussion of this risk. 
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data collection, recording, analysis, or retention is flawed, then the entire 
system is called into question.”215
Second, when developing these standards, the FBI should require po-
lice departments to provide mandatory predictive policing training to their 
staff. During this training, law enforcement agencies would describe: per-
missible methods for data collection, the limitations of this technology as a 
crime-fighting tool, and the constitutional concerns triggered by the use of 
this technology. The FBI should also provide third-party oversight by con-
ducting routine audits of predictive policing systems. During these audits, 
the FBI can ensure that local police departments comply with its mandatory 
standards for training, data collection and analysis. By auditing these sys-
tems, the FBI can effectively allay concerns about human manipulation of 
crime data.216
Third, FBI oversight is needed to validate and test algorithms of pre-
dictive policing software. Requiring neutral third party testing of these 
algorithms ensures that they paint an unbiased picture of criminal activity, 
and do not create self-fulfilling prophecies of bias against any demographic 
or geographic location.217 Recently, the need for third party monitoring of 
police practices to protect civil liberties was recognized in Floyd v. City of 
New York, where the NYPD was accused of abusing its power to stop-and-
frisk.218
Although Floyd’s procedural history led to debate about the validity of 
the court’s decision,219 the NYPD consented to adhere to some of Judge 
Scheindlin’s holdings. Primarily, the NYPD consented to allow third-party 
oversight of its aggressive stop-and-frisk program, which led to a dispro-
portionate number of stop-and-frisks taking place in black and Latino 
neighborhoods.220 Similar to the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, predic-
tive policing algorithms require closer inspection. When law enforcement 
uses predictive policing software to allocate resources, civil liberties are at 
 215.  See id. at 316–17. 
 216.  See Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 10 (noting concerns about manipulation of crime data 
following an audit of the NYPD’s crime statistics). 
 217.  See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 319 (arguing for third party testing and validation of algo-
rithms in order to establish the legitimacy of this technology). 
 218.  See generally 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 219.  Joseph Goldstein, Court Blocks Stop-and-Frisk Changes for New York Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/nyregion/court-blocks-stop-and-frisk-changes-for-
new-york-police.html?emc=edit_na_20131031&nlid=48206195&_r=0 (explaining the allegations that 
led to Judge Scheindlin’s removal). 
 220.  Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-
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stake because inaccurate data collection and algorithms can lead to crime 
forecasts tainted by human bias. In order to avoid abuses of police power, 
law enforcement must be held accountable for their policing strategies—
especially in already vulnerable low-income minority communities. 
  A neutral third party testing requirement would also help legitimize 
this technology, and make judges more inclined to accept the statistical 
outputs from these programs as evidence in the courtroom. Using the FBI 
as the gatekeeper for this testing would be particularly advantageous be-
cause it would enable private companies developing proprietary algorithms 
to maintain their trade secrets, while simultaneously ensuring that the quan-
titative data output from these programs is reliable. Additionally, requiring 
mandatory third party testing and validation of these programs will enable 
judges to rely on the quantitative data presented to them by parties in a 
courtroom without requiring judges to act as statisticians, who must parse 
complex algorithms or evaluate the minutia of data collection techniques. 
In this scenario, judges could defer to a sophisticated neutral-party’s opin-
ion about the validity of the data presented and focus on requiring police 
departments to define high-crime areas with increased specificity and accu-
racy. 
 Moreover, requiring police departments to narrowly define high-
crime areas is no Herculean task. A lot of crime data is readily available 
and can be plugged into common platforms, such as Google Earth. Thus, 
communities need not even rely on expensive proprietary predictive polic-
ing software. Instead, they can use these rather rudimentary programs to 
track various types of crime and demonstrate a propensity for a specific 
type of crime at a specific location. 
C. Courts Should Use Predictive Policing Technology to Create    
Narrow Definitions of High-Crime Areas Based on Both Geography and 
Crime Type 
Neutral third party oversight can bolster the legitimacy of predictive 
policing software and transform how judges evaluate high-crime classifica-
tions at evidence suppression hearings across the United States.221 As the 
use of this technology becomes a ubiquitous part of policing, and standards 
are implemented to ensure data reliability, judges should create narrowly 
defined high-crime area designations based on not only geographic loca-
 221.  Evidence suppression hearings are typically where courts must address whether an officer had 
the requisite level of reasonable suspicion required to perform the stop-and-frisk that yielded evidence 
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tion—but crime type as well. Judges should require law enforcement agen-
cies and prosecutors to present quantitative data to demonstrate that an area 
labeled as high-crime is in fact high-crime. 
  Law enforcement agencies will likely claim that procuring and pre-
serving the quantitative data an officer used to justify a finding of reasona-
ble suspicion is too burdensome of a responsibility. However, this is not the 
case. Technological advancements in the United States have created an 
overarching public expectation of transparency in government222 and have 
made it easier for government agencies to preserve data. In order to safe-
guard this transparency, many Americans’ believe that government agen-
cies have an institutional responsibility to preserve data that is critical to 
maintaining this transparency.223 The widespread growth of cloud compu-
ting has made it easy for government agencies to store vast quantities of 
data without overburdening their resources,224 and fulfill the public’s ex-
pectations for government transparency. 
  As explained in Part I, predictive policing technologies have the ca-
pability of not only forecasting where crime will occur on a micro-scale of 
a 500-foot radius, but can also predict the specific types of crime that are 
likely to occur at a given location in a community.225 Therefore, predictive 
policing software has the capability of meaningfully defining high-crime 
areas based on both geographic location and crime-type. Harnessing the 
full technological capabilities of this software enables law enforcement 
agencies to eliminate the vague and generic “high-crime area” label.  
Existing vague high-crime area definitions can be replaced by specific 
classifications of criminal activity, such as designating a location as a 
“high-brown heroin drug trafficking area” or “high-residential robbery 
area.” Using these crime specific classifications will help restore individu-
als’ Fourth Amendment protections in communities that were historically 
characterized as high-crime under Wardlow’s vague and overbroad stand-
ard.226 Narrowly defining crime areas can help restore Fourth Amendment 
protections by tightening the required nexus between direct observation of 
suspicious conduct and an area’s propensity for crime.  
 222.  The public’s desire for government transparency is so strong in the United States that Presi-
dent Obama issued a memorandum advising the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies to 
incorporate more transparency into government processes. See Memorandum for the Heads of Execu-
tive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/01/26/E9-1777/transparency-and-open-government#page-
4685.
 223.  See id.
224.  See Berg, supra note 11. 
 225.  Id.
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Tightening this nexus will make police officers more accountable for 
their stop-and-frisk activity, and limit the role that a person’s presence in a 
high-crime area can play when searching based on reasonable suspicion. 
Moreover, if law enforcement wants to benefit from predictive policing 
technology’s ability to predict crime in a 500-foot radius, then law en-
forcement should be constrained by this same specificity. An officer should 
be required to use the same level of specificity to prove that she had rea-
sonable suspicion to perform a Terry stop of a suspect in an area alleged to 
have a high propensity for a specific crime type. 
  Finally, because predictive policing technology is “[m]ore objective 
than a patrol officer’s hunch about an area”227 and harnesses the power of 
big data to find patterns of criminal activity based on statistical algorithms, 
judges should place the burden on law enforcement agencies and prosecu-
tors to present quantitative data supporting their high-crime designation. 
Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors should carry the burden of 
demonstrating that the data relied upon reflects a high-crime rate for the 
specific type of criminal activity the police officer suspected was afoot.  
  For example, if we applied the facts of Terry v. Ohio to a community 
using predictive policing software under this proposed model, would the 
court still find that Officer McFadden, the officer in Terry, had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to perform a stop-and-frisk?228 Officer McFadden 
could meet the threshold requirement for particularized suspicion because 
he watched the suspects walk back and forth past the jewelry store alone 
dozens of time, and each time stopping to peer in the window.229 However, 
officer McFadden’s finding of reasonable suspicion could be further bol-
stered if ten minutes before seeing the two suspects walking by the jewelry 
store, the predictive policing software installed in his patrol car corroborat-
ed his belief that the neighborhood had a high propensity for non-
residential burglary.230 Although, the facts of Terry are straightforward 
because of the suspects’ repetitive behavior, this example demonstrates 
how a court could use quantitative data as a tool to decide whether a lawful 
Terry stop was performed in an alleged high-crime area. 
 227.  Ferguson, supra note 15, at 265. 
 228.  392 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1968). 
 229.  Id.
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CONCLUSION
As Cornel West wrote in his forward to the New Jim Crow, “Martin 
Luther King Jr. called for us to be lovestruck with each other, not color-
blind toward each other. To be lovestruck is to care, to have deep compas-
sion, and to be concerned for each and every individual, including the poor 
and vulnerable.”231 As a society, we have an obligation to protect the civil 
rights of all people, including the poor and vulnerable. Restoring Fourth 
Amendment protections to low-income minority communities is essential 
to creating a socially just world. 
Predictive policing technologies can play a critical role in restoring 
Fourth Amendment protections to neighborhoods historically stamped with 
the “high-crime area” label. To ensure that this technology is used fairly 
and responsibly by law enforcement agencies, it is critical to establish both 
neutral third party oversight and mandatory uniform standards. The latest 
generation of predictive policing technology has the ability to forecast 
crime, based on both geography and specific crime type, and can be used to 
help courts and police departments narrowly define “high-crime areas.” 
Establishing narrowly defined high-crime areas based on quantitative data, 
will enable the courts to play an essential role in restoring Fourth Amend-
ment protections to people living in low-income minority neighborhoods. 
Tightening the nexus between observed suspicious behavior and sus-
pected criminal activity will help people living in these heavily policed 
neighborhoods recapture their eroded Fourth Amendment rights. Using 
quantitative data to narrowly define high-crime areas will require police 
officers to rely on more than a “hunch” to prove that an area has a high 
propensity for crime. And in turn, officers will be less likely to perform the 
arbitrary and intrusive stop-and-frisks to which many of the young minority 
men in these neighborhoods have grown accustomed.  
 231. ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at x–xi. 
